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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
It seems quite clear from the majority decision that the Court intended
to establish a constitutional rule that immunity from prosecution in one
jurisdiction must extend to another jurisdiction in order to compel incrim-
inatory testimony. Although there were no dissents in the Murphy case,
four Justices-White, Stewart, Harlan and Clark, all of whom dissented
from the decision in the Malloy case, which extended the Fifth Amendment
to the States-wrote or joined in concurring decisions in Murphy which
would limit the requirement of granting immunity from prosecution in
another jurisdiction. For instance, Justice Harlan stated that the rule
preventing federal officials from using incriminating testimony compelled
in a state proceeding, should be enforced by excluding such testimony or
its fruits by exercising the Supreme Court's supervisory power over the
federal courts, and not as a constitutional rule.
Congress has passed legislation which extends to a witness in a federal
proceeding immunity from prosecution, both as to federal and state crimes.
State immunity statutes, however, have never extended immunity from
federal crimes because to do so would probably violate the "supremacy
clause" of Article VI of the Constitution.2 2 However, the cases of Counsel-
man,23 which requires the immunity to be coextensive with the constitu-
tional provision it replaces; Malloy,24 which makes the Fifth Amendment
applicable to the States and the state and federal standard the same;
together with Murphy,25 which holds that a state witness may not be com-
pelled to give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law
unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any
manner; would seem to require that state immunity statutes be extended to
protect the witness from federal prosecution. At the very least, the rule
established in Murphy requires that the Federal Government establish that
it had an independent source of evidence upon which to prosecute, should
there have been a prior state inquiry in which the witness was compelled
to give incriminatory testimony in return for a grant of immunity.
THOMAS C. RYDELL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PROCESS OF LAW-STATUTE DENYING
PASSPORTS TO ALL COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE-In the recent case of Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 84
Sup. Ct. 1659 (1964), the Supreme Court of the United States was faced for
the first time with a challenge to the constitutionality of Section 6 of the
22 The authority of state laws or their administration may not interfere with the
carrying out of a national purpose, and where enforcement of a state law would handicap
efforts to carry out the plans of the United States, the state enactment must give way.
United States v. Mayo, 47 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Fla. 1942), aff'd, 319 U.S. 441, 63 Sup. Ct.
1137 (1943).
23 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 12 Sup. Ct. 195 (1891).
24 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 Sup. Ct. 1489 (1964).
25 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, supra note 25.
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Federal Subversive Activities Control Act,' which made it unlawful for any
member of a registered Communist organization to apply for, use or attempt
to use a passport. The resulting decision, in holding that section invalid on
its face, suggested permissible limitations on peace-time legislative control
over foreign travel by United States Communists.
Section 6 of the Act provided:
(a) When a Communist organization 2 . .. is registered, or there is
in effect a final order of the [Subversive Activities Control] Board
requiring such organization to register, it shall be unlawful for any
member of such organization with knowledge or notice that such
organization is so registered or that such order has become final-
(1) to make application for a passport, or the renewal of a pass-
port, to be issued or renewed by or under the authority of the
United States; or
(2) to use or attempt to use any such passport.3
In 1961, a final order of the Subversive Activities Control Board
directed the Communist Party of the United States to comply with the
registration provisions of the Act. Subsequently, two top-ranking Party
leaders, Herbert Aptheker, who was editor of the Party's "theoretical organ,"
and the late Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, who was chairman of the Party, were
notified that their passports were revoked; the use of those documents
was said to violate Section 6. After adverse holdings by the appropriate
State Department administrative bodies which reviewed the revocation
orders, Aptheker and Flynn brought separate actions for declaratory judg-
ments and injunctive relief in a federal district court.4 In those actions, both
plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that Section 6 violated the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fifth Amendment. A three-judge district court unani-
mously sustained the constitutionality of Section 6. The prohibitions of
that section were held to occupy a reasonable relation to the danger that
the section was intended to prevent, the danger including foreign travel by
United States Communists which was inimical to the internal security of
the United States.5 Under the Act, the purpose of the foreign travel (effec-
tively prevented by revocation of the passport) was not relevant in deter-
1 64 Stat. 993 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1958).
2 The term "Communist organization" was defined in the Act as any "Communist-
action organization, Communist-front organization or Communist-infiltrated organization."
64 Stat. 990 (1950), as amended, 68 Stat. 777 (1954), 50 U.S.C. § 782 (1958).
3 Supra note 1.
4 The decision in both cases is found in Flynn v. Rusk, 219 F. Supp. 709 (D.D.C.
1963).
5 The other grounds embodied in the complaint were that Section 6 was unconstitu-
tional as (1) an abridgement of the plaintiff's freedoms of speech, press, and assembly
under the First Amendment, (2) a prohibited bill of attainder under Article I, Section 9
of the Constitution, (3) a deprivation of the right to a trial by jury required by the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments and Article III, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution, and
(4) the imposition of a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment. Since the decision of the Supreme Court rested on the violation of the Due Process
clause alone, the other grounds were not discussed by the Court.
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mining the applicability of the provision. Nevertheless, the district court
felt that the resulting presumption-in-fact of a harmful purpose was "not
so unreasonable as to violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights."0
On appeal, the Supreme Court held Section 6 to be excessively broad
and therefore unconstitutional. Contrary to the decision in the district
court, the Supreme Court held that the section did not bear a reasonable
relation to the danger it was intended to prevent. The majority of the
Supreme Court considered the section invalid on its face, incapable of
application even to the top-ranking Party leaders involved in the present
case. Justices Clark, Harlan and White dissented.
Prior to Aptheker, there were few cases involving the constitutionality
of peace-time restrictions on foreign travel. Freedom to travel had been ex-
pressly recognized to be within the "liberty" of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. 7 Today, a passport is necessary to exercise this free-
dom to travel abroad, and, in fact, a federal regulation makes it a crime to
travel outside the Western Hemisphere or to Cuba without a passport.8
Moreover, as a common means of proving citizenship, a passport is essential
to free movement in and out of most foreign countries.
It has long been recognized that the freedoms set forth in the Bill of
Rights are not as absolute as the language by which they are set forth; the
federal government can impose restraints, if reasonable, on those basic
freedoms to prevent substantive harm, for example the harm to the people
resulting from tactics designed to overthrow the government by violence.9
If the restraint in a given situation is not reasonably related to the danger
sought to be prevented, the statute can be declared unconstitutional and
inapplicable, 10 or even absolutely void in some situations, e.g., if it invades
First Amendment freedoms." Recognizing the dangers created by Commu-
nist organizations' advocacy of the violent overthrow of the government, the
courts have repeatedly upheld legislation checking such dangers at the
expense of the members' First Amendment freedoms. 12
Prior to Aptheker, an administrative body had imposed restrictions
on the issuance of passports to members of Communist organizations. In the
period between 1917 and 1931, and from World War II until 1958, the
6 219 F. Supp. 709, at 715 (D.D.C. 1963).
7 Kent.v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 78 Sup. Ct. 1113 (1958).
8 In accordance with 22 C.F.R. §§ 53.1-53.8 (1959), as amended 22 C.F.R. § 53.2 (Supp.
1964), issued and promulgated under 66 Stat. 190 (1952), 8 U.S.C. 1185(b) (1958). The
provision of this statute making it unlawful to enter the United States without a passport
was held unconstitutional in Worthy v. United States, 328 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1964).
9 American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 70 Sup. Ct. 674
(1950); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 71 Sup. Ct. 857 (1951); compare Yates v.
United States, 354 U.S. 298, 77 Sup. Ct. 1064 (1957).
10 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 Sup. Ct. 247 (1960).
11 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736 (1940), one of the earlier cases
taking this view.
12 See generally Annot., 95 L. Ed. 875 (1951) and Annot., 100 L. Ed. 661 (1956).
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State Department had denied passports to American Communists who
went abroad to engage in activities detrimental to national security. This
action was taken pursuant to a federal statute which gave the Secretary of
State the authority to "grant and issue passports."' 1 However, in the 1958
case of Kent v. Dulles,14 that federal statute was held not to delegate the
power to deny passports to persons based on their Communistic beliefs or
Communist associations. But lower federal courts, prior to the Aptheker
case, had implied that the freedom to travel could be limited by specific
Congressional action. 15
The 1950 Subversive Activities Control Act was designed to correct
the danger presented by the United States Communist organization and
the world Communist movement. The legislative intent, embodied in Sec-
tion 2 of the Act,16 included the statement that foreign travel was a pre-
requisite for carrying on activities to further the purposes of the Communist
movement. The justifications of the latter finding, which were documented
in the Appellee's brief in the Aptheker case, 17 were that foreign travel by
American Communists was necessary: (1) to give orders and to exchange
secret information, (2) to receive training in subversive activities, (3) to
allow the Russian dominated movement to exercise closer control over its
branches, (4) to carry on espionage, propaganda and revolutionary activities
in foreign countries, and (5) to provide a supply of United States passports
that could be used by third parties.
In the Aptheker case, the Supreme Court, in reversing the lower court,
found that: (a) Section 6 was unconstitutional because it did not bear a
reasonable relation to the danger sought to be protected against; and (b)
regardless of the fact that travel of top-ranking Party members, such as
the plaintiffs, might have been the very danger that the section was designed
to prevent, the breadth of the section rendered it void on its face.
The unreasonableness of the section was said to be found in three
factors. First, the section applied whether or not the individual actually
knew he was associated with a Communist organization; constructive knowl-
edge by publication in the Federal Register was sufficient. The case of
Wieman v. Updegraf s'8 was said to support a finding that the lack of a
requirement of (actual) knowledge was unreasonable. In that case, Okla-
homa attempted to bar disloyal state governmental workers by requiring
1a 44 Stat. 887 (1926), 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1958). For the history of administrative regula-
tion of passports, particularly in respect to Communist Party members, see generally Brief
for Appellee, pp. 81-87, Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 84 Sup. Ct. 1659(1964).
14 357 U.S. 116, 78 Sup. Ct. 1113 (1958).
15 Schactman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d 905
(D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 918, 80 Sup. Ct. 255 (1959); Worthy v. United
States, 328 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1964).
16 64 Stat. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 781 (1958).
17 Brief for Appellee, supra note 13, at pp. 25-35.
18 344 U.S. 183, 73 Sup. Ct. 215 (1952).
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state employees and officers to take a loyalty oath to the effect that for the
past five years they had not been members of groups included on the
United States Attorney General's list of Communist front and subversive
organizations. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of the United States found
this requirement to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment on the ground that one must know the organizational purpose
of a particular group before the fact of membership could be said to indicate
disloyalty. The Oklahoma statute did not require such scienter. Any
membership, in effect, gave rise to a conclusive presumption of disloyalty.
However, as pointed out by the dissent in Aptheker, the statute in the
Wieman case did not require knowledge of the government's listing, and
termination of membership in the particular organization would not avoid
the sanctions of the statute. The contrary was true under Section 6 of the
Federal Subversive Activity Control Act since actual or constructive knowl-
edge of the registration or final order was necessary, and termination of
membership was said to permit avoidance of the sanctions of the Act. The
majority decision countered the attempted distinction by stating that in any
event actual knowledge was sufficient, and that freedom of association cer-
tainly would be denied if the effect of Section 6 was to force the termina-
tion of membership.
The second and third factors listed by the majority in Aptheker to
show Section 6 to be unconstitutionally broad were that the individual's
degree of activity in the organization, and his purpose for travel were not
relevant in determining the applicability of the section. These, the most
serious objections, were said to be highly relevant in determining the likeli-
hood that the travel would be attended by the type of activity which Con-
gress sought to control. The government had argued that it would be im-
possible to prevent travel associated with activities dangerous to internal
security without proscribing all Communist travel. Once the trip was made
the possible harm could not be prevented. The dissenting justices agreed
with the government's contention, citing numerous cases where all persons
in a class were validly barred from certain conduct, although all persons in
that class might not engage in harmful conduct. The majority of the cited
cases could be divided into two classes: those relating to prohibitions affect-
ing persons in peculiarly influential positions, for example, the exclusion
of any labor unions from enjoying the privileges of the National Labor Re-
lations Board if any officer of that union was a Communist Party member; 19
and those relating to prohibitions as to aliens or naturalized citizens, for
example, the deportation of all aliens who had been members of the Party. 20
However, none of these cases involved the broad restraint (e.g., denial of a
passport that would permit travel) of all citizens, (who need not be in
peculiarly influential positions) on the ground of Communist Party member-
ship. The NLRB regulation, which affected only a small number of Party
19 American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 70 Sup. Ct. 674 (1950).
20 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 72 Sup. Ct. 512 (1952).
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members, was considered the only method of minimizing the dangerous
political strikes advocated by the Party, and could be said to merely take
away the power by which the Party members, union officers, could call
political strikes. Resident aliens' rights in a deportation proceeding are
considerably less than those of a citizen. 21 Congress, having the power to
naturalize citizens, likewise has the power to denaturalize for acts indicating
lack of allegiance to the United States.22
In declaring Section 6 void on its face, the Supreme Court accorded
protection to the freedom of travel, the freedom implied in the Due Process
Clause, similar in breadth to that protection given the First Amendment
freedoms.23 Because of the "case and controversies" limitation to any factual
situation, not only the one before the court, i.e., decisions that a statute
was void on its face were generally peculiar to the area of freedom of
expression. The case of Thornhill v. Alabama24 suggests the reason for that
exception in the freedom of expression area. There, individuals who
appeared to have been engaged in relatively peaceful picketing pursuant
to a labor dispute, were indicted under an anti-picketing statute. The all-
inclusive anti-picketing statute was held invalid on its face. The Court
there recognized that a State might have the authority to prohibit certain
types of picketing, for example, violent picketing; but all picketing could
not be proscribed. Peaceful picketing was the working man's means of
expression. And, although a court would normally restrict its holding
regarding the invalidity of a statute to the facts before it, a broad statute
which was capable of sweeping and improper application in the area of
First Amendment freedoms could be declared invalid on its face. Otherwise,
an inhibitory effect on such freedoms could result.
Likewise, in N.A.A.C.P. v. Button,25 the court held invalid on its face
a Virginia statute under which the state sought to prevent the NAACP
and its separate incorporated Legal Defense Fund from retaining attorneys
in connection with actions to which those organizations neither were
parties nor had a pecuniary right or liability. It had been the common
practice of those organizations to provide such services for private parties
in actions which could effect the maintenance of racial barriers. The
statute was held void on its face because it could curtail litigation and thus
considerably slow down civil rights activity on behalf of Negro citizens.
The basis of the majority decision in Aptheker was that the travel
restrictions effectively imposed by Section 6 violated the Due Process Clause.
21 See generally 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Aliens and Citizens §§ 71, 81 (1962), and Annot., 100
L. Ed. 661, 664 (1956).
22 See 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Aliens and Citizens, §§ 140, 166 (1962).
23 Exceptions to this general rule, including that exception regarding laws which
would deter freedom of expression, are listed in United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17,
80 Sup. Ct. 519 (1960).
24 310 U.S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736 (1940).
25 371 U.S. 415, 83 Sup. Ct. 328 (1962).
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It is interesting to note, however, that here the Court was not only con-
cerned with the freedom to travel. The freedom to travel was firmly bound
to the freedom to associate with groups of ones own choosing. Membership
in subversive organizations resulted in a bar to the use of a passport
necessary to travel.
The Aptheker decision makes it clear that Congress cannot validly pro-
hibit peace-time foreign travel by all members of Communist organizations.
The decision further suggests that such travel might be limited if the act
proscribed the use of passports by individuals (a) knowing themselves to
be members of registered organizations and knowing the subversive pur-
poses of such organizations, (b) being active in such organizations, and (c)
intending to travel abroad with the object of engaging in conduct that
could be dangerous to internal security. Whether a statute so limited could
effectively prevent subversives from engaging in conduct abroad that would
be dangerous to internal security appears doubtful. Dangerous activity
could be engaged in by inactive or seemingly inactive Party members.
Certainly, the intention of engaging in dangerous activities abroad would
not be truthfully communicated to passport officials before departure from
the United States. After the individual returned to the United States,
the giving of orders and exchange of secret information would have taken
place, the training would have been received, and the other dangerous
activities accomplished. More drastic measures would then be necessary
to minimize the effects of the activities.
It is now apparent, however, that the freedom to travel declared to be
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause will be viewed by the courts with
respect approaching that accorded to the First Amendment freedoms.
MRs. S. MELOY
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CONFESSIONS-NEw YORK PROCEDURE FOR
DETERMINING THE VOLUNTARINESS OF A CONFESSION VIOLATES THE DUE PRO-
CESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-In the case of Jackson v.
Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 Sup. Ct. 1774 (1964), the United States Supreme
Court held that the New York procedure for determining the voluntariness
of a confession did not adequately protect the defendant's constitutional
right' to be free from a conviction based on a coerced confession.
Under the New York rule, 2 the trial judge was required to make a
preliminary determination regarding the voluntariness of a confession
1 It is now axiomatic that a defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process
of law if his conviction is founded, in whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession,
without regard for the truth or falsity of the confession. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S.
534, 81 Sup. Ct. 735 (1961).
2 People v. Weiner, 248 N.Y. 118, 122, 161 N.E. 441, 443 (1928).
